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Abstract: The paper reviews the role of Noam Chomsky in the conceptual changes in modern psychol-
ogy that are described by many as the cognitive revolution. Several aspects of the work of Chomsky
are identified as key elements in the changes regarding the human mind, and the determinants of hu-
man nature. The mentalism of Chomsky resulted in the general spread of theory theories about human
development, where the human mind is interpreted as a theory-using open, creative system. The pe-
culiarities of sequential behavioral organization and later the sequential interface issues as well as the
concentration on (syntactic) pure form were important inspirations for several general theories of hu-
man cognition. Chomsky, with his differentiation between competence and performance, opened the
road along with David Marr to multilayered computational theories of the mind. While the innatist com-
mitments of Chomsky regarding human development created many fruitful controversies during half a
century, they also tied the underdetermined nature of human language with the philosophical issues
of freedom. Language with its innate recursive system is a basic factor of human freedom. Freedom is
connected to a rational image of humanity.
Keywords: Noam Chomsky; mentalism; theory theories; syntactic theories of mind; innatism; freedom
and language
This is a mainly historical paper. I do not intend to analyze the validity or
veracity of the linguistic theories of Chomsky, and their precise role in the
development of modern psycholinguistics. My modest aim is to show the
historical role of his theories in the shaping of modern cognitive science.
The paper mainly concentrates on the outline of these influences, and rarely
goes into the details of the impact.
The mid-20th century certainly was characterized by dramatic changes
in the outlook of experimental and theoretical psychology, and in gen-
eral in the fields that have gradually become the cognitive sciences. For
quite a while this change of outlook has been labelled (or self labelled) as
a cognitive revolution, in several autobiographic accounts (Bruner 1983;
1997; Miller 2003) and in overviews such as Gardner’s (1985) by now classic
personalized treatment of these events (for more distanced interpretations,
2559–8201 © 2019 Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest
Acta Linguistica Academica / p. 398 / September 9, 2019
398 Csaba Pléh
see Baars 1986; Greenwood 1999). Through a variety of different influences
would-be cognitive psychologists came to realize two important aspects in
mid-20th century. First, the human mind has a real existence. It is “real”,
in the sense that its effects are seen in behavior. Further, there are scientific
ways to study the mind without losing the objectivity professed by behav-
iorism and the governing positivist philosophy. The mind can be brought
to experimental studies using indirect measures, and its workings can also
be modelled by computer programs. According to many participants the
precondition for the cognitive revolution was a disappointment with be-
haviorism and a motivated rejection of behaviorism (Gardner 1985). There
was a dramatic shift of interest and terminology in mainstream experimen-
tal psychology between the 1960s and 1980s. A new image was born where
the basic determinant of behavior is not the stimulus itself but its interpre-
tation, the internal model of the environment. There was a thematic shift
and a desire to overcome behaviorism, which motivated the protagonists to
speak of a new scientific paradigm as a cognitive revolution. The essential
point of this novelty was the rediscovery of humans as knowers. A vi-
sion was gradually created according to which man can be seen as a being
actively modeling the environment, and human behavior can only be un-
derstood with reference to these models (Pléh & Gurova 2013). As shown
by a later social history analyst (Cohen-Cole 2005), a most important as-
pect in this process was a postulated parallelism between the work of the
scientist and the mental work of the individual ordinary knower. Both
were interpreted as theory builders.
Many accounts consider the late fifties already as a crucial time for
the changes. These were the times when the importance of Chomsky and
modern linguistics in the changes within psychology first appeared (Baars
1986). George Miller, one of the founding fathers of the new movement, has
designated a special moment for the birth date of the cognitive move. This
moment would be a conference on September 11, 1956, the second day at a
“symposium organized by the Special Interest Group in Information The-
ory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology” (Miller 2003, 142). Here
the new cognitive psychologists, such as Miller himself, the linguists rep-
resented by Chomsky, and the researchers of the new computer based ap-
proaches to thought represented by Newell et al. (1958) with their pattern
searching problem-solving programs met. “In short, 1956 was a good year
for those interested in theories of the mind, but it was only slightly better
than the years just preceding and following. Many were riding the waves
that began during World War II: those of servo theory, information the-
ory, signal-detection theory, computer theory and computers themselves”
(Miller 2003, 142).
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There certainly was and is an element of self-aggrandizement here,
when the changes are referred to as a revolution, and several sober ac-
counts do indicate that it was mainly a shift of emphasis from the be-
having person towards the knowing person, rather than a real revolution
(Mandler 2002a;b).
Within psychology, the new vision certainly created a group conscious-
ness. In a sociological sense there certainly was a radical shift of emphasis,
also supported in the 1970s by the new theories of the development of
science and the concept of scientific paradigms and revolutions. The idea
that science is theory-dependent was crucial for the new generation of cog-
nitive psychologists. The message was simple. There are drastic changes
in science, and we, the new cognitive forces, may be the agents of one of
these drastic changes:
“[…] there clearly was a sociological shift in that psychologists appeared to
become persuaded that the cognitive research program was more promising
than the behavioral research program. This shift was not logically compelled
but rather was a function of […] the persuasive writings of key cognitive
researchers and theorists (e.g., Chomsky). […] unlike a bona fide scientific
revolution this shift in emphasis is best characterized as a sociological phe-
nomenon – a change in allegiance that interestingly may be due in part to the
claim (which has immense rhetorical value) that a scientific revolution has
indeed taken place.” (O’Donohue et al. 2003, 85)
It is worth remembering that the very notion of paradigm as applied
by Kuhn (1962; 1970) to comprehensive models and their shifts in nat-
ural sciences was treated in an ambiguous manner by the psychologists
themselves. Some of them, like the dissident learning theorist/cognitivist
Palermo (1971; Weimer & Palermo 1973) proposed drastic shifts and a
sequence of psychology of consciousness → behaviorism → cognitive psy-
chology. Others, like Thomas Leahey (1987) realized the softer nature of
psychology, talking about it even as a “multiparadigmatic science”. This
would imply a more social than conceptual change in the case of the cog-
nitive paradigm shift as well.
From the trilogy of mind, cognition, affection, conation (see Hilgard
1980 about this heritage) they cultivated almost exclusively cognition. In
classical cognitive research we arrive at a rather peculiar view of human
life. We have a thoughtful contemplative man who concentrates on the
form of representations. They started to treat not merely science but also
the individual knower as “theory dependent”, as a being characterized by
strong internal theories. As shown by a later social history analyst (Cohen-
Cole, 2005), a most important aspect in this process was a postulated
thoroughgoing parallelism between the work of the scientist and the mental
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work of the individual ordinary knower. Both were interpreted as theory
builders. In these later changes, generative grammar and the associated
philosophy of the mind had a crucial role.
As for linguistics, Chomsky himself in Olson et al. (1991) denies the
use of paradigm shift for these changes, but both in his attitude and in
the work of the first generation of Chomskyans there was an element of
radical change in their criticism of previous models and the articulation of
the novelty of their own model (Postal 1964; Katz & Postal 1964).
The modern linguistics initiated by Chomsky promoted several inspir-




3. The centrality of form: the idea of syntactic pure form
4. The centrality of sequential thought
5. A computational theory of mind
6. Generic and specific innatism
7. Human freedom and the freedom entailed in human language
The issue of mentalism
The first important message psychologists have taken up from Chomsky
was the idea that the human mind has a rich internal structure, in which
language plays a central role. From the time of the cognitive revolution on,
the mind ceased to be an empty abstraction in psychology, and language
on its part also ceased to be an external appendage to an otherwise less
structured human mind (Miller 1990). Chomsky was a key person in the
general and strong appeal of linguistics attracting a new generation of psy-
chologists in the 1960s. Roger Brown, one of the leading first-generation
psycholinguists, identified and spelled out this attraction of psychologists,
who felt a new appeal of grammatical organization in the mind. “It has
taken the psychologists a long time to realize that the linguist means some-
thing when he says: ‘Language is a system’. Very simply he means that
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when someone knows a language he knows a set of rules […] The most im-
portant thing psychology can get from linguistics is the reminder that hu-
man behavior includes the response that is novel but appropriate” (Brown
1958, X–XI). This quote shows the impact of the new grammar: combining
ideas regarding rules and creativity. Chomsky himself spelled out several
times that in an abstract way linguistics itself is part of psychology – not
unlike the way Quine (1969), a Harvard analytic philosopher, would claim
a decade later that epistemology should become a chapter of cognitive
psychology. Linguistics is “a branch of cognitive psychology” (Chomsky
1968, 1). It is “That part of psychology that focuses its attention on one
specific cognitive domain and one faculty of mind, the language faculty”
(Chomsky 1980, 4). Chomsky showed this association between linguistics
and psychology in a programmatic manner in Language and mind already
in 1968:
“The study of language may very well, as was traditionally supposed, provide
a remarkably favorable perspective for the study of human mental processes.
The creative aspect of language use when investigated with care and respect
for the facts shows that current notions of habit and generalization as deter-
minants of behavior or knowledge are quite inadequate. The abstractness of
linguistic structure reinforces this conclusion and it suggests further that in
both perception and learning the mind plays an active role in determining the
character of the acquired knowledge. The empirical study of linguistic univer-
sals has led to the formulation of highly restrictive and I believe quite plausible
hypotheses […] that contribute to the attempt to develop a theory of acquisi-
tion of knowledge that gives due place to intrinsic mental activity. It seems to
me, then, that the study of language should occupy a central place in general
psychology.” (Chomsky 1968, 84)
Regarding the internal history of linguistic epistemology, the idea of a
psychological reality of grammar had a methodological role as well. The
early Chomsky followers started form an idealized image of deciding which
grammar was better for a given language. In this decision process they
started to believe in the superiority of the grammatical solutions that were
assumed to have psychological reality.
Chomsky had an almost apodictically easy wording: psychology sub-
sumes linguistics. His early mentalism also leads to another methodical
claim: the belief that humans have access to the intricacies of their mental
grammar through linguistic intuitions (Chomsky 1965). Later, however, he
skipped this commitment to intuition, and started to claim that linguistic
competence is an unconscious knowledge of language. As he said in an
interview, “We don’t have, we couldn’t have, conscious knowledge of these
principles” (Cohen 2004, 53).
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In the interpretation of his early philosopher follower, Jerrold Katz,
mentalism also implies a causal role of mental events and grammar in
language behavior: “linguistic theories must contain concepts which en-
able linguists to formulate the principles of mental operation that underlie
speech” (Katz 1964, 126).
Chomsky’s own statements on the mental reality of grammar moti-
vated much work in the empirical study of the psychology of language, and
also much theoretical discussion as well. The theoretical issues are mainly
concerned with two problems. Do psychological studies give support for
given particular linguistic solutions, and are they dealing with our basic
competencies of understanding and production of sentences, or with some
kind of metatheory about our abilities to judge our own sentences? Most
importantly, however, the specific notions Chomsky introduced had a great
effect on empirical psychology. Cognitive psychologists were not satisfied
with the abstract identification of linguistics as a chapter of psychology,
but looked towards developing a specific chapter of cognitive psychology,
developing a modern-linguistics educated psycholinguistics. The Chom-
skyan inspiration showed up in two domains in the formation of this later
central chapter of cognitive science: the experimental study of sentence
understanding and later production in humans, and empirical, both obser-
vational and experimental studies on the unfolding of the linguistic system
in children.
Language and psycholinguistics have played a central self-defining role
for many cognitivists for over two generations by now. For an early sum-
mary two generations ago the little book of Judith Green (1973) is still
a good historical source. Jacques Mehler (1969, 3), the Chomsky-trained
French psycholinguist, when he analyzed the birth of the cognitive move-
ment, underlined the changes in the philosophy of science associated with
the cognitive movement, and the specific role of language sciences:
“During the last hundred years positivism was having an important effect; it is
only since the last decade that it’s felt less. As a matter of fact the decline of
behaviorism seems to be related to the birth of modern psycholinguistics. The
basic idea underlying the ‘post-behaviorist’ study of language in psychology
was mentalism. It involved the basic assumptions of mentalistic linguistics that
each speaker carries in her head a grammar of her language and this grammar
is used in creating and understanding an infinite number of possible sentences,
and second that speakers have an ‘access’ to this hidden language of theirs in
forms of linguistic intuitions.”
Katz (1964) warned very early on that there is a methodical problem if
mentalism implies a reliance on intuitions:
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“the linguist can no more look into the head of a fluent speaker than a physicist
can directly observe photons or a biologist directly observe the evolutionary
events that produced the human species. The linguist, like the physicist and
biologist, can only achieve scientific understanding by constructing a model of
the system which contains a hypothesis about the structure of the components
of the system that are not observable.” (ibid., 128)
Gradually, even Chomsky (1980) has given up his original belief that gram-
mar is accessible for lay persons in the form of linguistic intuitions. He
claimed eventually: “Our perfect knowledge of the language spoken by us
does not give us access to these principles; we cannot even hope to be able
to define them ‘internally’ relying on introspection or reflection” (ibid.,
231). The indirect study of the mental representation of language has be-
come the proper domain of psycholinguistics, rather than the direct use
of intuitions. The mentalistic inspiration towards psychology has become
an ontological mentalism, combined with a methodological objectivism.
This was true not merely of the Chomsky inspiration, but of the whole of
cognitive psychology. Cognitivists do not go back to traditional mentalim
that was characterized by the use of introspection as the basic means of
gaining psychological knowledge:
“The rise of cognitivism has not been, nor was it ever intended to be, a wholesale
return to the mentalism of the past. […] Instead, cognitivism was an answer to
the problem: how can we introduce (at least part of) the mental back into
scientific psychology while not falling prey to the criticisms that brought down
the mentalism of old psychology and led us to behaviorism. In other words,
how can we have our mental cake and eat it too? The answer that cognitivism
has provided […] is that as long as the aspects of the mental that are revived
are restricted to those that are susceptible to truth-evaluation […] then the
behaviorists’ criticisms of mentalism will be stayed.” (Green 1996, 37)
Theory theories
The general idea of a theory-based approach to humans, and especially to
children, an interpretation of children as theory makers was outlined by
Chomsky in several early trend-setting papers on innatism. The structure
of the argument had implications and extensions for all of modern cognitive
psychology. In this vision, language acquisition itself is a process of theory
formation and hypothesis testing, and psychologically speaking, grammar
itself is an implicit theory of the given language:
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“The [language acquisition] device might proceed to acquire knowledge of a lan-
guage in the following way: the given schema for grammar specifies the class of
possible hypotheses; the method of interpretation permits each hypothesis to
be tested against the input data; the evaluation measure selects the highest val-
ued grammar compatible with the data. Once a hypothesis – a particular gram-
mar – is selected the learner knows the language defined by this grammar […] his
knowledge extends far beyond his experience and is not a ‘generalization’ from
his experience in any significant sense of ‘generalization’.” (Chomsky 1967, 8)
The vision of the “child as a little linguist” was provocative and even seemed
to be arrogant when it was first proposed. Chomsky promoted a conception
of humans as individual carriers of a theory of their native language. This
representation of language was assumed to be a theory in the strict sense
held by the interpretation of Carnap (1934/1937) that was proposed for
the language of science, also involving a separation of syntax and semantics
in scientific language. This was certainly a strong antimetaphysical claim
for a philosophical reduction of science as analyzed by Hintikka (1991).
Still, the separation of form from content implied by this move has be-
come a thorough impact of Chomsky on language processing research, and
has become a central proposal for the entire modern cognitive psychology,
alongside his proposal that humans are carriers of theories and they do
develop specific theories in each domain of knowledge.
Skinner in 1963 criticized the vision of the child as being a little linguist
by claiming that this was equivalent to the claim that if a dog is trained
to do some balancing performance, one could as well suggest that the dog
acquired an intuitive physics. At the time, this felt for the Skinner followers
as a strong blow to the ontological generosity of the Chomskyans. But in
reality, that is what happened in actual mentalistic cognitive research, and
even in the case of many modern ethologists. The “theories in the mind”
notion has evolved into a revolutionary general idea in late 20th-century
developmental psychology. The theory notion has been extended beyond
language to areas of physical and social knowledge. Humans started to be
interpreted as carriers of physical and psychological naïve theories. This
spread of theory theories has been a basic message of Chomsky in two
respects regarding all human development. It embodied the idea of an
innate organization as a starting point, and it suggested that all domains
of knowledge are structurally organized. Today, we freely talk about naïve
physics, naïve arithmetic and so on. The move started by infants being
interpreted as little linguists continued by treating humans as entertaining
theories of the mind and especially ideas about other minds (Leslie 1987),
and theories about the articulation of the physical world (Spelke 2000).
In an interesting manner, as shown by some of his new metatheoretical
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statements (Chomsky 2005; 2015; Chomsky & McGilvray 2012) Chomsky
himself was not happy when his innatism claims regarding language have
become part of the biological inheritance talk. He reverted several times
to the idea that language has innate constraints not due to a particular
biological construction, but due to some universal laws of physics.
The centrality of form: the idea of syntactic pure form
In the famous examples of separating grammaticality and meaning with
sentences like Colorless green ideas sleep furiously, Chomsky (1957) intro-
duces the idea of the primacy of syntax and form into cognitive organiza-
tion. As a consequence and analogy to this, the first generation of cogni-
tive scientists interpreted humans as general-purpose symbol manipulating
machines modeling human processes in flow charts and block schemata,
with the central notion of representation. This was usually accompanied
by a primary concentration on formal aspects both regarding represen-
tations and regarding the models of cognition. Cognitive research in the
1960s under the direct influence of Chomsky repeated for general cogni-
tion what had been initiated by linguistic and literary theories in the 1920s
(early linguistic structuralism of the Russian formalists), and by the several
waves of form-centered avant-garde artistic movements also in the 1920s.
The new experimental cognitive psychology of language in the 1960s
had two new aspects that were directly related to Chomsky. It was dealing
with sentences rather than words, and regarding sentences it treated syn-
tactic form as a central component. This was parallel to the way syntax was
being treated in formal linguistic theory as the central, novelty-generating
component of grammar, with two types of interpretation around it, seman-
tic and phonological interpretation. This was also extended into a general
philosophical proposal of a syntactic theory of mind according to which
all of our knowledge is organized in a sentence-like propositional manner
(Fodor 1981).
This commitment to form had interesting technical consequences
within psychology. Experimental cognitive psychologists have preserved
the methodical commitments inherited from behaviorism. In designing
their experiments, they clearly differentiated between independent and
dependent variables. Stimulus preparation has become more and more so-
phisticated in modern cognitive psychology. In the new cognitive mode,
the independent stimulus variables still had to be characterized in an
independent manner, like the physical characterization of stimuli in clas-
sical experimental research. Now, however, linguistic and logical stimulus
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analysis entered the preparation of materials. As Roger Brown (1970, v)
mentioned half a century ago, psychology journals have become filled with
sentence trees and similar characterizations. With all changes in detail,
this attitude remained a constant feature of the new psycholinguistics for
half a century.
The entire idea of looking for the psychological reality of grammat-
ical descriptions and rules was spelled out by Miller and Chomsky very
early on:
“The psychological plausibility of a transformational model of the language user
would be strengthened, of course, if it could be shown that our performance
on tasks requiring an appreciation of the structure of transformed sentences
is some function of the nature, number and complexity of the grammatical
transformations involved.” (Miller & Chomsky 1963, 481)
The form-centered approach starting from these ideas was the first step in
modern psycholinguistics. Starting with studies by George Miller (1962)
and his group, the experimental psycholinguistic research program took
off. While it had its own development over half a century, it also moved
psycholinguistics to a central place in modern psychology (Miller 1990).
Miller (1962, for a late summary, see Miller 1990) initiated the ac-
tual implementation of these ideas into research on the role of grammar
in speech comprehension. His students like Susan Carey, Roger Shepard,
Donald Norman, and most importantly, psycholinguists like Tom Bever
and Jacques Mehle were to become central in cognitive research. These
first-generation cognitive students would become the new mainstream gen-
eration of cognitive psychologists and sentence processing psycholinguists.
Within psycholinguistics proper, regarding the centrality of syntax, the
primacy of form over meaning, and rules over reshaped habits in the be-
haviorist sense resulted in several debates during the last half century. In
sentence understanding for example, meaning-centered approaches soon
emerged. Some of them also started to question the assumed temporal
primacy of form-based processes (Sachs 1967; Johnson-Laird & Steven-
son 1970; Fillenbaum 1973; Flores d’Arcais 1974). In a famous series of
studies using lexical access during sentence processing, parallel form- and
meaning-based models have been proposed:
“The results demonstrate that both types of analysis [formal and semantic] are
actively engaged in processing the input from the first word of a sentence on-
wards, and that there is no sign of any delay relative to the syntactic analy-
sis of the input. Thus, there is no evidence that the global structure of sen-
tence processing is ordered in time in the ways which the autonomy assumption
requires.” (Marslen-Wilson & Tyler 1980, 57)
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Similar effects started to be much discussed, because they were not merely
interpreted as signs of the speed of understanding, but also as signs
of constant interaction between multiple information sources, especially
language-related and more general knowledge-related sorts of information
during sentence processing. The group of scholars who belonged to the
“interactionist camp”, such as the connectionists, claimed that we are fast
because all of our mind is transparent and uses all information in a parallel
manner, while the form-centered people claimed that in these situations the
context does not change word recognition, it merely softens the acceptance
criteria. As summarized by the textbook of Clark and Clark (1977) early
on, form-based, content and knowledge-based, and interactionist models
soon started to develop (for a classic example of the interaction issue see
Forster & Olbrei 1973). The essential point for the Chomsky inspiration
here is not the relative truth of these models. For all of them the starting
point was the strictly formal approach emulating Chomsky.
The same is true for the recurring debates between rule-based and
habit-based models of representation and processing over half a century,
as summarized in Table 1.
Chomsky and his followers criticized learning theory principles in and
via language acquisition. Language acquisition was characterized by them
as a self-organization and rule formation, and the unfolding of innate pro-
grams rather than association and environmental determination (Chomsky
1959; Miller & Chomsky 1963). This was the beginning of a straightforward
dual view of mental functioning: there is a mechanistic and a structure-
dependent mode of functioning. For complex forms of behavior such as lan-
guage, structure-dependent rule following is the norm. From the late sixties
on, however, this view of dual organization was gradually replaced by an
overarching unifying trend within the same structure and form centered
group. Specifically, a conception took shape suggesting that all interesting
processes should be dealt with in the framework of structure-dependent
processes and hypothesis testing rather than association. This was accom-
panied by an explicit denial of the role of habit formation in establishing
language competencies. This conception replaced the duality of learning
versus rules, association versus structure with an overwhelming structural-
ism (Chomsky 1968). Here again, the starting point for the compromise
models were the rule-based models stating from Chomsky.
The debates on rules concentrated specifically on language where the
testing ground was the system of the English past tense. The starting point
is that children at certain ages do overgeneralize the general rule of -ed
past tense to irregular or so-called strong verbs. They say goed rather than
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went, comed rather then came. Traditional cognitive accounts claimed that
overgeneralization errors observed in children around 3–4 years indicate the
emergence of rules compared to earlier reliance on elements. In research
traditions, this was followed by a victory of rules across the board. The
new approach introduced by generative grammar concentrated on rules in
understanding and the learning of language as opposed to simple patterns
and habits.
Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) in an associative countermove with
their connectionist model proposed that one does not need to postulate
rules at all here. A proper statistical learning machine can produce the
same errors as children make. Rumelhart and McClelland treated rules
not as internal inherent laws of the mental system but as external char-
acterizations of the products of the mental system. They were running
computer programs that were reproducing the error pattern of children
with simple associative item learning, eliminating the level of rules from
the proposed mechanism.
From the history of ideas point of view, it is interesting that after the
great controversies of symbol processing versus sub-symbolic i.e., connec-
tionist networks (Rumelhart & McClelland 1986; Clark 1989), synthetic
works by Pinker (1991; 1999) in the following decade allowed symbolic
and rule-based systems for syntax and regular morphology (learn–learned),
and an associative item-based (connectionist) network for irregularities
(teach–taught) and for words in general. Pinker proposed a dual model,
where the duality represented smart, rule-based systems along with prob-
ability-based associative subsystems. The rule systems would be related to
the anterior, frontal parts of the cortex, while the item-based associative
system to the posterior, temporal part in line with clinical and brain re-
search data. Still later models such as Ullman’s (2001) tend to juxtapose
the two systems in a new manner as a procedural system (rules) versus a
declarative system (words). In this way, the entire symbolic–sub-symbolic
debate of grammar versus connections has become an issue of how to put
cognition into the explicit/implicit dimension or into Gilbert Ryle’s (1949)
differentiation between KNOWING WHAT and KNOWING HOW. Classical in-
formation processing machines and the corresponding psychology would
be criticized for singling out the world of KNOWING WHAT while the do-
main of KNOWING HOW, i.e., the domain of skills would become critically
important.
Psycholinguistics has developed into a rich leading field in the cogni-
tive domain. A volume for psycholinguistics in the new Millennium edited
by Anne Cutler (2005) pointed out the many-faceted nature of recent psy-
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Table 1: The fate of rules over half a century of cognitive research
Stage features Main topic about rules Representatives
Rules win over habits 1960-
1970




Mental rules direct every-
thing 1965-1980





tions from 1980 on: connec-
tionism




Dual models: Words and
Rules 1990






Rules belong to the proce-
dural knowledge system
Ullmann
cholinguistics. The four key moments according to her are linguistics, bi-
ology, experimental study of production and comprehension, and the re-
lations between modeling and experimentation. During its half a century
career several lines of explanatory models developed in psycholinguistics.
In the explanatory models pro or contra, the Chomsky inspiration is clearly
present.
A. Internalist linguistic-psychological explanation. The understanding
of computations is an explanation in itself. Difficulties of sentence
processing might be explained by the allocation of working memory
resources, for example. This corresponds to the original mentalistic
and formal inspiration of Chomsky.
B. Neural. Especially due to evoked potential technologies becoming
easier to handle and more sensitive, and due to the appearance of
functional brain imaging while processing language, computational
explanations started to look for different brain localizations and
temporal components of supposed sub-processes such as early syn-
tax, later syntax, semantics, and pragmatics. The Chomsky inspira-
tion emerges in the temporal primacy of formal processing proposals
(Friederici 2002).
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C. Computational models. Strong claims have been proposed both in
processing and in development by postulating powerful general pat-
tern-generating statistical procedures. A theoretical and, at the same
time, empirical debate emerged between statistical and grammar-like
computations. Regarding processing, the statistical approach is a
radical interactionist move, and regarding development it corre-
sponds to general (statistical) learning mechanisms as contrasted
to grammar-specific models (see Gervain 2014 for the debates). But
in a way again, in its theoretical motivation it goes back to, and chal-
lenges, the early fights of Chomsky (1956) against statistical models
of language.
D. Evolutionary. Distal (final) explanations are sought for even in psy-
cholinguistics, in general, or specifically in human evolutionary ex-
planations, such as human sociality and its role in structuring even
sentences. The “usage based” pragmatic theory is supposed to find its
evolutionary anchorage (Tomasello 2003). This, again, is a strong re-
action against the exaptation-based structural self-sufficient models
proposed by Chomsky (2005; 2015), though there are several com-
promise proposals like that of Jackendoff (1992).
E. Social. Both processing and development should be interpreted in
basically pragmatic frames. These frames, on the other hand, are
grounded in the behavioral and communicative coherence or in the
socialization practices, related to intention attribution and naïve
pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely 2007; 2009).
The formal models entertained by early psycholinguistics had broader im-
plications as well. Formal models extended to the study of many other
fields of cognition. Structural trees analyzing the contexts in episodic mem-
ory appeared in the study of memory. Rewriting rules and corresponding
sentence like trees appeared, which treated actual events in a sentence
structure-like manner like I STUDY IN THE LAB [John kissed Mary] (Anderson
& Bower 1973). The formal approach even appeared in the study of story
organization, where rewriting rules and tree structures of the kind STORY
→ SETTING + EPISODE, EPISODE → STATE + ATTEMPT, ATTEMPT →
PLAN + ACTION + OUTCOME were proposed. The resulting structures
had a neat similarity to the sentence structures of Chomsky (1965), on
which they were explicitly relying. The inspirations from Chomsky were
more language based compared to the mere use of graphs in decision the-
ory. Following Rumelhart (1975) “Several models of story grammars were
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proposed. Essentially, all of them treated stories as a series of embed-
ded attempts trying to achieve a Goal” (Pléh 2003, 192). Later on, these
grammar- and form-based models were replaced by more social interpre-
tation and attribution based models, but the important starting point was
the analysis of pure form (for a survey of a generation of research on story
grammars, see Pléh 2018).
Regarding the models of form-based representations, the aspect of
time has become a central dimension. On the basis of relating decision
times and stimulus differences, levels of representation were suggested that
were themselves ordered in time, claiming by an extension of the attitude
about the primacy of formal syntax, a form-based computation and a form-
centered representation as the first level. A form → meaning sequence was
postulated everywhere, from letter recognition to story paraphrases. The
models were treating humans in information processing terms (Broadbent
1958; Lachman et al. 1979). It has soon become evident that the temporal
fate of different codes and representations is a flexible process. The context
and the task have been shown to have a determining influence over the
retention of different codes.
The centrality of sequential thought
There were classical ideas regarding the psychology of language two gener-
ations before Chomsky that emphasized that syntax and sentential orga-
nization were crucial because in sentences there was an assumed transition
from a holistic organization of thought towards a sequential unfolding in
speech. Wilhelm Wundt was claimed to have summarized these classical
ideas in the analysis of simultaneous-successive transitions as the essence
of sentence structure (Bever 1970). Wundt was rediscovered by classical
cognitive psychology. Blumenthal (1970) went as far as to claim Wundt to
be a precursor of the notion of deep and surface structure as proposed by
Chomsky (1965).
These antecedents for the new grammar were rediscovered as distant
ancestors by Bever and Blumenthal. A crucial, broader and not merely his-
torically interesting role was played by the theoretical and experimental
neobehaviorist Karl Lashley in his proposal for sequential organization as
an argument for all kinds of internal organization. Lashley (1951) claimed
that even to explain co-articulation effects or speech errors one has to
postulate neural representations of linguistic units rather than mere reflex
chains. Sequential behavior is moving too fast and is too finely tuned to
the context to be merely regulated by chain reflexes and feedback loops.
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Chain reflexes could not account for anticipatory errors, for the fact that
something coming later has an influence on behavior. One has to postu-
late internal plans and their execution cycle to account for sequentially
organized fast behavior:
“Finger strokes of a musician may reach sixteen per second in passages which call
for a definite and changing order of successive finger movements. The succession
of movements is too quick even for visual reaction time. […] Sensory control of
movement seems to be ruled out in such acts. They require the postulation of
some central nervous mechanism which fires with predetermined intensity and
duration or activates different muscles in predetermined order.” (ibid., 123)
From these general considerations of movement organization, Lashley
moved on to grammar:
“Any theory of grammatical form which ascribes it to direct associative linkage
of the words of the sentence overlooks the essential structure of speech. The
individual items of the temporal series do not in themselves have a tempo-
ral ‘valence’ in their associative connections with other elements. The order is
imposed by some other agent.” (ibid., 116)
The issue of syntax is relevant for all complex movements, thus, linguistic
organization, as shall be the case promoted by Chomsky, is a model for all
complex organizations.
The sequential internal organization idea promoted by Lashley has
come up in modern cognitive psychology in two lines of arguments. Chom-
sky (1959, 48) in his most influential review of Skinner’s book on Verbal
behavior commented several places on the Lashley paper, claiming in the
long run that it argues for a grammatical analysis:
“In short, it should be possible to derive from a properly formulated grammar
a statement of the integrative processes and generalized patterns imposed on
the specific acts that constitute an utterance. […] The problem of specifying
these integrative processes and selective mechanisms is nontrivial and not be-
yond the range of possible investigation. The results of such a study might, as
Lashley suggests, be of independent interest for psychology and neurology (and
conversely).”
Even in the third edition of his seminal Language and mind book in 2006
Chomsky complained how unnoticed the Lashley paper was:
“Critical voices, even those that commanded considerable prestige, were simply
unheard. For example, Karl Lashley gave a brilliant critique of the prevailing
framework of ideas in 1948, arguing that underlying language use – and all
organized behavior – there must be abstract mechanisms of some sort that are
not analyzable in terms of association and that could not have been developed
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by any such simple means. But his arguments and proposals, though sound and
perceptive, had absolutely no effect on the development of the field and went
by unnoticed even at his own university (Harvard), then the leading center of
psycholinguistic research. Ten years later Lashley’s contribution began to be
appreciated, but only after his insights had been independently achieved in
another context.”
Lashley’s presentation at a high profile neuroscience symposium, the
“Hixon symposium”, had a large effect. The audience was filled with people
like John von Neumann, Lorente de Nó, McCulloch and so on, leading neu-
roscientists arguing for internal neural organization and cognitive model
makers. As a matter of fact, due to the attention of the high-prestige au-
dience and to the analysis of Chomsky, Lashley did not remain unnoticed.
Most interestingly, the other neobehaviorist whom Chomsky saved
from his own critique of behaviorist models in the 1960s was Edward Tol-
man (1932) with his assumed plans underlying animal behavior. The in-
teresting point is that while the sequential internal motor patterns empha-
sized by Lashley corresponded to the issue of sequentialization in complex
behaviors, Tolman (1948) with his internal maps argued for a holistic vi-
sion of internal mental life. Tolman was a great name in his time, and
his debates with the followers of Hull on place versus response learning
in mazes were central to theories of learning. This seemingly outdated
debate is still relevant. For the cognitivists it is related to the issue of
whether we are entitled to postulate animal representation systems. The
cognitive approach to learning represented by Tolman became popular in
psychology from the 1970s. Cognitive maps in cognitive psychology are no
longer outlandish extravagant notions, but trivialities. Chomsky (1968) in
his Berkeley talks presented Tolman as a forerunner of his own mentalistic
modelling.
It is rather intriguing for the history of ideas that in much later works
of his Chomsky (2015) has himself gone back to the issue of simultaneous-
sequential organization. He basically claims now that the plans in the Inter-
nal I-language are non-sequential in nature, and sequentiality is enforced
by turning to the phonetic-acoustic interface. Thus, in a way, the original
issue of Wundt and Lashley of how to put holistic thought into articulated
sequential output comes back.
The issue of sequentiality has become widespread beyond Chomsky’s
own work by the book of his close early associate George Miller. The famous
planning conception proposed by Miller et al. (1960) saw in sentences the
basic form of a structure-based holistic planning rather than “mere predic-
tion”. The theoretical book argued for the postulation of pre-existing plans
of behavior, starting from simple movements to complex plans of chess or
language.
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A computational theory of mind
The hierarchy of languages proposed by Chomsky (1956) had a central
role in the unfolding of modern computational linguistics. The attitude of
Chomsky is in several ways ambiguous in this regard. He follows the hu-
manist tradition of modern linguistics by claiming the specificity of human
language, and at the same time, he is convinced that linguistics is a natural
science. He is the founding father of modern computational linguistics, but
at the same time he is not too sympathetic to computer-inspired reduc-
tionism in the study of human cognition. As a result of these ambiguities,
he has become an inspiration of computational theories of the human mind
on two levels: on a concrete level of a syntactic theory of mind, and on a
more abstract level, as one of the proponents, along David Marr, of a more
subtract multilayered computational approach to the mind.
On the first level, Chomsky and his vision of language played a cen-
tral role in the birth of a syntactic theory of mind (Fodor 1981; 1985). As
Forgács (2010) in his review of Fodor (2008) emphasized, while Chomsky
mostly remained neutral regarding the extensions of his theory to the in-
tegrity of human thought, Fodor (1975) became the first lord of an ex-
tended syntactic theory of mind. The language of thought (LOT) hypoth-
esis promoted by Fodor (1975) rephrased the Leibnizian topic in the light
of the machine age. Programming languages translate instructions of a
higher order into instructions of a lower order, to arrive at a machine code
at the end. Similarly in humans: there is a final language, a mentalese.
Human thought can be interpreted as an organization, where some final
instances (the very propositional organization) correspond to a pre-wired
language. The proposal that the language of thought is similar to a ma-
chine code is intended to avoid an infinite regress. “While all thought is
symbol manipulation, i.e., translation, finally there is a language, a form
of thought provided by nature herself. The LOT is a linguistic a priori sys-
tem” (Pléh 2008, 218). Hinzen (2017) has a similar claim about not merely
postulating a propositional syntax for thoughts, but basically identifying
it with linguistic syntax.1
But even psychologists of the first cognitivist generation who have
in many empirical regards become meaning-centered, like Jerome Bruner
(1983) also treated the “structuralism” of the cognitive efforts as central.
This was mostly accompanied by a decompositionist vision, which is also
familiar from the arts: dissecting complex processes into simple compo-
1 I would like to thank Csaba Czeglédi for reminding me of the importance of Hinzen
in this regard.
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nents. In the syntactic theory of mind representational relations are princi-
pally of a linguistic nature, and meaning and representation is a secondary
step in any processing. Human thinking is interpreted as a merely for-
mal system. In a syntactic engine, sentences lead to other sentences and
in our mind propositions lead to other propositions (Clark 1989). Ideas
themselves would be organized in a sentence-like manner (Fodor 1975).
The postulated Language of Thought in this Syntactic Theory of Mind is
responsible for a comprehensive internal mental organization, with impli-
cational relations between representations.
On the more abstract level of computational theory, the inspiration of
Chomsky was parallel to the ideas of David Marr, who proposed the idea
of formal analysis, and the structure of research even into the study of
vision. According to Marr (1982), the first task of the scientist is to make
a conceptual analysis into the problem, which is the “computational level”
in the logics of research. There is a one-to-many relationship between this
level and that of the algorithms actually used by humans, which is the
second level. The third level would be the actual software-based or neural
implementation of the algorithm. In principle, several realizations could
be made available for the very same computational theory. That is the
reason why the work of Marr has become an influential model in cognitive
science. This is a new pattern different from the one proposed by early
artificial intelligence researchers. For the early studies the starting point
was the program rather than the structure of the cognitive task. The thesis
of Marr was a thought provoking realization of the possibility of machines
on an abstract level.
In a similar manner, Miller and Chomsky (1963) emphasized half a
century ago in connection with language that the theories of performance
(e.g., speaking, the third, implementation level in Marr’s terminology) have
to embody a grammar, a theory of competence, and a naïve model of
language that is necessary for the acquisition of the language by each native
user. Or to put it in another way, it needs a theory about the requirements
that any implementation theory has to fulfill. In a way, the Chomskyan
(1965) distinction between competence and performance corresponds to
the computational and algorithmic levels assumed by Marr (Gentner 2010).
And the third level, the implementation level would correspond in language
to what Tom Bever (1970) a long time ago claimed to be the issue of
performance mechanisms.
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Generic innatism and specific innatism
Some of modern linguistics together with accompanying psycholinguistics
openly advocated a Cartesian cognitive message (Chomsky 1966; 1986).
For Chomsky innatism was one way to overcome the “empty organism”
and “black box” metaphor of the behaviorists. Innate organizing principles
of language and other complex human achievements belong to “species-
specific behaviors” in the style of the early ethologists. In the hand of his
followers, this general innatism claim has usually been transformed into
the specific innatism claims of the modularists (Fodor 1983).
Two types of genetic reasoning in modern psychology
In the late 1950s there were two roads within psychology that led to an
interest towards the genetic determinants of behavior. The first one was the
idea of universal nativism, the second the issue of the genetic determinants
of individual differences, as summarized in Table 2.
Table 2: New biological ideas about the determination of development in the 1960s
Type of innovation Key novelty Opponents Leading representatives
Universal nativism Cognitive structures
are a priori









The psychological interests were in a way continuously divided. Some peo-
ple were and are mainly interested in the genetic components of individual
differences, while others in the generic, species-specific, supposedly innate
determination of certain functions. In a comprehensive biological theory,
these two issues are certainly not separated. In the Darwinian model, vari-
ations are all over the place, and the extended Darwinian model, the “mod-
ern synthesis” from the 1930s on, connected the idea of variation to genetics
in a population-statistical manner. Interestingly, however, in psychology,
the two interests continued to develop separately for quite a time, well
into the second half of the 20th century. It is a rather peculiar merit of
Chomsky that his approach and stance on innatism had a say in both
regards.
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Generic inheritance
The work of the “generic innatist” group followed the argumentation initi-
ated by Chomsky, and applied it to psychology in a universalistic manner.
Most of the research was interested in the early development of some par-
ticular abilities, or domains as they preferred to call them later on, like
language, numbers, face recognition, and the like. The main arguments
for a generic genetic determination were based on early developmental
manifestations, cross-species comparisons, content-specific developmental
disorders, and less frequently, real cross-cultural comparisons.
Chomsky thought that the arguments for an innate system underlying
language were: its universal structural features, contrasting it with animal
communication systems; and most importantly, for the psychologists, its
universal and fast acquisition, based on limited and distorted data, and its
following a critical-period style of development. The critical period theo-
ries, which represented for Chomsky the classic ideas of German embryol-
ogy in the work of his teacher, Eric Lenneberg (1967), were an accommo-
dation of the innatist theories. Before the formation of recent epigenetic
theories of development, they were allowing for the influence of individual
experience factors supplementing the innate mechanism, usually talking
about species-specific stable environmental factors in the sense of Don-
ald Hebb (1949). It is of historical interest that Chomsky has taken these
ideas from his European mentors. He identified his distant inspirations
(Chomsky 1966) from Descartes and Port Royal grammar to Humboldt.
But he had more local inspirations as well. A most likely key influence was
Roman Jakobson who was teaching at Harvard at the time Chomsky was
there. Jakobson claimed as early as 1941 that there are universal tendencies
across languages in the acquisition of the sound system, and the system
unfolds in a preprogrammed universal manner. Another European refugee,
Eric Lenneberg (1967), was transmitting all the mid-20th century German
biological and innatist ideas, together with an inspiration to read mod-
ern ethology. As he mentioned at several places (Chomsky 1965, 1968),
the new discoveries of neuroscience about geometrically sensitive cortical
structures (Hubel & Wiesel 1959) and the idea of Lorenz (1941/1962) were
important immediate motivations for his innatism.
Regarding the mechanisms of language acquisition the original rather
strong, but rather philosophical claims of the Chomskyan generic innatist
stance have been taken seriously by the data-minded cognitive researchers
as well. Debates developed over two generations, but the starting point
for the debate was the strong innatist claim. The original Chomskyan
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philosophical claims about innatism were turned into empirical claims by
merciless psychologists. Chomsky himself became ambivalent regarding the
interpretation of these scientific developments initiated by him. Recently,
he moved back to a position overstepping the identification of innatism
with genetic determination. According to Chomsky (2005; Chomsky &
McGilvray 2012), innatism is assumed to follow from universal constraints
due to the physical organization of the world in a physicalist naturalistic
theory, rather than from genetics.
Table 3 shows the changes in the conception of Chomsky himself,
partly as a consequence of the changes brought about by empirical psy-
chological studies between 1967 and 2012.
Table 3: The early and later innatism and biolinguistics arguments of Chomsky
Aspect Early 1960s 2000s
Rationalism Innate system Innate system
Development Abduction acquisition Parameter setting
Mental structure Modular mental organ Genetic modularity
Inner buildup Syntax is central I-language, UG, recursion
Biology of origin Macro mutation and exaptation Tinkering, universal physics
The concept of innatism under the inspiration of the generative grammar
initiated by Chomsky was dynamically changing during the last half cen-
tury, both within the innatist group and in creating new oppositions to it.
Chomsky originally used a conceptual epistemological reasoning in favor
of innatism. He pointed out, without too much evidence being available in
the 1950s, that on the basis of accidental experience all children develop
a grammar showing universal features, and each child roughly follows an
identical pathway. Furthermore, this happens with little instruction and
little feedback from the environment (the “poverty of stimulus” and “no
negative evidence” principles). The theoretical innatism of Chomsky has
led to empirical translations in the language sciences. The most essen-
tial thing has become modern child language research, using observational
and experimental methods. This has partly followed the Chomsky inspi-
ration (Brown 1973), but some of its representatives have questioned the
innatist program in many ways, particularly regarding the setting of pa-
rameters during development. In the 1970s Jerome Bruner (1974) did so
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on the basis of a social theory of development, and in the 1990s Annette
Karmiloff-Smith (1992) and Elman et al. (1996) proposed a combination
of actual developmental patterns with a reinterpretation of modularity
and innatism. Recently Michael Tomasello (2003) and Gergely Csibra and
György Gergely (2009) have argued for the formative role of the environ-
ment in the unfolding of the linguistic system in children. The poverty
of stimulus conception promoted by Chomsky is replaced by a modern,
ethologically inspired argumentation where the child and the environment
form a combined learning-teaching system together. It is the very process
of acquisition which is assumed to be innately organized, not the gram-
mar itself. But here again, the very provocative strong initial claims by
Chomsky (1967) have become a motivation for half a century of actual
research controversies.
The same is more or less valid for the implications of the biolinguistics
program for the origin of language issue. Chomsky (1967) started from
strong claims regarding the sudden appearance of human language, its
unique organization compared to animal communication systems which
are restrained, use motivated signs and so on. Half a century of ethological
work has been motivated by trying to disprove these claims, showing the
gradual development of signing systems, their stepwise complication and
the likes. Chomsky even when he accepted these new developments with
regard to gradual developments he maintained that this is merely Faculty
of Language Broadly taken, and Faculty of Language in the Narrow sense
is still unique, comprising the suddenly appearing recursive syntax (Hauser
et al. 2002). The human-specific proposals of the humanist were motivating
decades of research of the naturalists.
The views of Chomsky on the inheritance of intelligence
At roughly the same time when the modern innatist program in cogni-
tive research was born with the initiation of Chomsky (1967), the issue
of genetic determinism of human behavioral and intellectual individual
differences became the focus of increasing scientific attention again. This
reemerging view also started in the mainstream as a criticism of behavior-
ism. The new psychogeneticians denied that the behaviorists’ simple life
history based empiricism could be a possible way to explain individual
differences. To explain individual differences, they referred to the Galto-
nian paradigm that proposed heredity to be crucial in determining indi-
vidual differences in behavior, and basically presupposed an additive role
of nature (genetics) and nurture (environment) (for a critical contempo-
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rary stance on this, see McLafferty 2006). The followers of Galton consid-
ered even interaction as a mere statistical term, and did not consider the
possibilities of substantial proactive visions of interaction, where human
agents as environmental factors factually enter the causal chain, in chang-
ing schooling patterns, for example. In the individual variation domain,
the interest in the genetics of intelligence was often linked to a conserva-
tive social philosophy and to a belief in a stable social order. It remained
true for the late 20th century as well (Burt 1961).
There was a wider context to all of these debates that was raised at
the time by Chomsky (1978). Chomsky as a representative of both the
generic innatist group and a radical left-wing social thinker questioned
several issues in the reasoning of one of the most open advocates of the
genetics of intelligence vision, the position of Jensen (1969), and especially
that of Herrnstein (1973) in a rather radical manner, as well as some of
the naïve liberal criticisms directed against Herrnstein. First, Chomsky
expressed his puzzlement why the possible inheritance of any trait is such
a disturbing social issue:
“The question of heritability of I.Q. might conceivably have some social impor-
tance, say, with regard to educational practice. […] It is, incidentally, surprising
to me that so many commentators should find it disturbing that I.Q. might be
heritable, perhaps largely so. Would it also be disturbing to discover that rel-
ative height, or musical talent, or rank in running the 100 yard dash, is in
part genetically determined? Why should one have preconceptions one way or
another about these questions?” (Chomsky 1972b, 44)
He moved on to more basic and disturbing social issues, to question the
very distribution of social rewards:
“It is alleged that in our society remuneration correlates in part with IQ. But
insofar as that is true, it is simply a social malady to be overcome much as slav-
ery had to be eliminated at an earlier stage of human history. […] The standard
arguments for ‘meritocracy’ have no basis in fact or logic.” (Chomsky 1978, 122)
Only capitalist society distributes rewards in a meritocratic manner:
“Consider […] the claim that IQ is a factor in attaining reward and that this must
be so for society to function effectively. Herrnstein recognizes that his argument
will collapse if, indeed, society can be organized in accordance with the ‘socialist
dictum’, ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’.
His argument would not apply in a society in which ‘income (economic, social,
and political) is unaffected by success’ [according to Herrnstein], transmittable
wealth and power accrue to mental ability, and must, for society to function
effectively. If this assumption is false and society can be organized more or less
in accordance with the ‘socialist dictum’, then nothing is left of Herrnstein’s
argument.” (Chomsky 1972b, 34)
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According to Chomsky, another misleading factor is related to the very
notion of intelligence. Differences in intelligence between groups are mea-
suring the wrong thing:
“We have to study less complex issues. An inquiry into such questions as race and
IQ appears to be of virtually no scientific interest. Conceivably, there might be
interest in correlations between partially heritable traits, but if someone were
interested in this question he would surely not select such characteristics as race
and IQ, each an obscure amalgam of complex properties. Rather, he would ask
whether there is a correlation between measurable and significant traits, say,
eye color and length of the big toe. It is difficult to see how the study of race
and IQ can be justified on any scientific ground.” (Chomsky 1978, 132)
Chomsky arrived at the same conclusion as Pinker (2002) a generation
later: social equality of opportunity is not an issue of abilities, but an issue
of principle:
“Human talents vary considerably, within a fixed framework that is characteristic
of the species and that permits ample scope for creative work, including the cre-
ative work of appreciating the achievements of others. This should be a matter
for delight rather than a condition to be abhorred. Those who assume otherwise
must be adopting the tacit premise that a person’s rights or social reward are
somehow contingent on his abilities. […] In a decent society opportunities should
confirm as far as possible to personal needs, and such needs may be specialized
and related to particular talents and capacities.” (Chomsky 1978, 127)
Pinker continues with similar claims. The claim of universal human na-
ture should be accompanied by accepting the large individual differences
at the same time. According to Pinker, the difficult task is to accept dif-
ferences and at the same time believe in equality. We should stand for
equality on a moral basis. At the same time, with all the genetic variations
acknowledged, we should see clearly that these variations are relatively
small, compared to other primates.
Human freedom and the freedom entailed in human language
Chomsky’s influence as an anarchist political thinker (Chomsky 1972a;b;
1986; 1988) and as a constant critic of American politics, of the distortive
strategies of the media, and of international anti-liberal trends also made
him a rather central visionary of the image of man in modern psychology.
His views on language and on freedom are intrinsically related. Chomsky
is a leading proponent of a theory where humans are unboundedly free
and this freedom is related to the central, distinct, human-specific feature,
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namely the design of human language which is characterized by unbounded
creativity.
Language, while it is genetically determined, is not a constraint on
thought. Rather, by its very structure, due to its openness, language,
both as a system and in its actual use, is unbounded and unlimited,
and therefore it also ensures the unlimited free development of human-
ity (Chomsky 1972a; 1978; 1988). In the tradition of relating freedom and
epistemology, in European modern development empiricists tended to be
freedom-oriented, like John Stuart Mill, and rationalists tended to be more
authority-oriented. Chomsky has broken this alliance. He preaches an in-
natist vision of the human mind that entails undeniable freedoms. Human
cognition is characterized by certain prepackaged cognitive systems, which
constitute part of our human nature (Chomsky 1967; 2015).
This break with the tradition of liberalism=environmentalism was
summarized by Steven Pinker (2002). Pinker in his book criticizing the en-
vironmentalist position exposed this universalistic innatist attitude clearly
as a positive program. He showed that for many people the Darwinian
commitment to an image of human nature was usually accompanied by
a rather liberal egalitarian social philosophy. According to Pinker, and
the entire universalist-innatist group, the traditional combination of egal-
itarian commitments with enviromentalist psychological positions was a
mistaken path. The starting point for the optimists should be, on the one
hand, a postulation of a rich human nature, and acceptance of the very
rich human universals.
Human language is central to this system, due to its inherent creativ-
ity. Technically, this creativity is related to his views on recursion, which
show up in all stages of his work (Chomsky 1957; 2005; Hauser et al. 2002).
When Chomsky started these claims, his approach to the creativity of lan-
guage fit into the general new enthusiasm of psychology about creativity.
However, his approach was different in a crucial regard from the cultivation
of creativity in the psychology of the 1960s. The psychological approaches
were mostly unstructured, loose associative conceptions of the creative na-
ture of the human mind, while Chomsky (1957) concentrated on creativity
as being structure-sensitive and rule-based. The creativity of syntax is
based on a rule system, as I tried to show at the time (Pléh 1976). For-
mal syntactic creativity remained a central point of the Chomskyan vision
of creativity, even when it became supplemented by semantic and theory
of mind based pragmatic creativity (Kenesei 2013). The unbounded and
unconstrained creativity of language is a crucial assurance for human free-
dom. It insures that our expressive system is not an obstacle to thought.
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In this refreshed rationalistic vision the frames of thought do not come
from experience. This sort of innate determination, however, is a key to
the uniformity and universality of the human condition. Were our thinking
entirely at the mercy of the environment, we would be entirely victims of
the accidental features of the environment, thus we would not be free. In
fact, the secret of freedom is that our thought has experience-independent
features.
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